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Responses to Patrick O'Farrell 
In this first issue of the Australian Religion Studies REVIEW, continuity is affirmed with its 
predecessor the AASR Bulletin, with the following Responses to Professor Patrick 
O'Farrell's Keynote Address to the 1986 AASR Conference, published in the AASR 
Bulletin in March 1987. 
The Future of Australian Religion 
- A Response to Patrick O'Farrell 
Ian Gillman 
University of Queensland 
Patrick O'Farrell makes 'no apology for 
casting' the issues he raises 'in the form of 
a challenge to Christianity'. His paper is 
replete with issues to be taken seriously by 
the representatives of that faith in our 
midst - including me. But more to the 
immediate point for this response are the 
challenges he presents-
• to the AASR 
• to scholars of religion in' general in 
Australia, and 
• to the self-understanding of 
Australians 
O'Farrell considers that the AASR 'has 
not served me well', insofar as it has 
seemed to shy away from grappling with 
the 'many things about religion in this 
country I desperately wish and need to 
know'. He cites, in particular, the absence 
of any substantial attention in conferences 
to 'the study of irreligion and anti-
religion' in Australia. On that he has a 
point. It is true that the emphasis on the 
non-Judaeo-Christian traditions has been 
predominant at conferences. The study of 
those other traditions has been left in the 
main to such 'bodies as the Australian 
Association for Theological Studies. The 
AASR has taken as its charter the non-
Judaeo-Christian traditions, as if not to do 
so was to call into question its raison d' etre. 
In part this emphasis may have been seen 
as one way of establishing that the AASR 
was not just another learned theological 
society with but a side interest in the 
wider field of the history of religions. It 
may also be that links with the Charles 
Strong Foundation have encouraged this 
tendency, in that the Foundation's 
Lecturers are, by defini tion, required to 
focus on the non-Judaeo-Christian 
traditions. 
I, for one, do not want to be as critical 
of this as is O'Farrell. The AASR is not the 
only forum within which the Judaeo-
Christian tradition may be examined. 
However, he is right to alert us to the fact 
that we may well convey the impression 
that we have at best a peripheral concern 
with that tradition, and would not be all 
that worried if it had no representation at 
all on conference programmes. In other 
words the impression may be conveyed 
that we are actually the Australian 
Association for the Study of non-Judaeo-
Christian Religions - and that would 
deny what our name claims. 
On the other hand some of the 
publications of the AASR, or those in-
spired by it, like Alan Black and Peter 
Glasner's Belief & Practice, (Allen & 
Unwin, 1983), show substantial concerns 
for the place of Christianity in our national 
life. The membership list shows a consid-
erable nUlnber with major interests in 
Judaism, Christianity, Biblical Studies, 
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Theology, Aboriginal and Australian 
Religion, and related fields. It may be that 
more sustained effort is needed by those 
with such interests to see that the results 
of their research are more adequately 
aired at conferences and in print. 
But in itself this may well leave largely 
untouched the fact that little attention has 
been paid to the appearance and nature of 
irreligion and anti-religion in Australia. 
This phenomenon has a long history in 
our midst - indeed it was there from the 
outset of white settlement. That it needs 
documentation is very clear, and it may 
well be a theme taken up in a section or a 
plenary session at a future conference -
in fact why not at this Bicentennial year 
conference in Brisbane? 
Allied to criticism of the AASR is that 
of those who teach the various 'religious' 
subjects on offer at the tertiary level in 
Australia. Faced not infrequently with the 
on-campus suspicion that they are 
'evangelists in drag' they respond quite 
naturally with a heavy stress on objective 
scholarship. While religious commitment, 
where it exists, is not denied, neither is it 
flagrantly displayed. (Much of this may 
well have had its roots in that secular tra-
dition epitomised by the ban of the 
University of Melbourne from teaching or 
granting degrees in divinity or theology -
fortunately a singular provision in 
Australia). However, my experience does 
not support the claim that those involved 
in such teaching are to be characterised 
generally as 'remote clinicians', caught up 
in a 'cult pursuit' in 'a small sub-culture ... 
totally irrelevant to the wider affairs of 
Australian life and culture'. I suspect that 
in this Professor O'Farrell relies on 
hearsay evidence rather than on first hand 
contact on a wide scale. This I say in spite 
of a degree of agreement that frequently 
curricula in such departments are set by 
concerns traditional in Europe and North 
America where many of the staff had at 
least their postgraduate training. 
As for the roots of the attitude which 
regards religion as 'a joke ... a complete 
irrelevance', or of 'no consequence in the 
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counsels of the nation', I see these as pre-
dating the decision to ignore religion in 
the establishment of Australian universi-
ties - as curiously understandable as this 
may have seemed at the time. The roots lie 
in the fact that virtually from 1788 on-
wards religion was regarded as asocial 
utility - its role was that of a handmaid 
to individual morality, and, through such 
'reformed' individuals, a useful social in-
fluence. Its value was seen also in areas of 
practical social service, and matters of 
principle, theological or liturgical, were of 
little consequence to a Phillip, a 
Macquarie, or a Menzies. What was of 
greater impact was public acceptance of 
liberal Benthamite utilitarianism, and the 
equation of this, along with certain neo-
Stoic and Platonic ideas, with Christianity. 
This equation was accepted by most 
church members, as well as by those 
whose 'Christianity' was no more than 
that of census identification. Sectarian 
squabbles, so called 'moral crusades', and 
the natural tendency to look for practical 
outworking and to be impatient with 
intellectualising led to a suspicion and re-
jection of religion as a matter of substan-
tial temporal or eternal consequence. That 
'divinity was at best' a fringe subject in 
only two Universities (Sydney and 
Queensland), taught almost wholly on a 
part-time basis and regarded with suspi-
cion merely as a means of training clerics, 
did nothing for its status in the eyes of 
academia. Little wonder that those in-
volved in this 'peripheral teaching' were 
keen to see that academic standards were, 
if anything, more rigorous than those in 
other areas of the humanities. 
As to Professor O'Farrell's broader 
comments about Australia having become 
a multi-faith society, I could not be more 
in agreement. It is iqdeed a glaring blind-
spot that for all the talk about multi-cul-
turalism little, if any, notice has been taken 
of the multi-faith implications of such a 
situation. It may be obvious to the resi-
dents of Lakemba, Woolgoolga, or 
Helensburgh, but most Australians and 
their governments seem oblivious of this. 
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A very recent request from the Office of 
Multi-cultural Mfairs in the Prime 
Minister's Department to the AASR for 
some assistance in this area came with an 
impossible deadline - the sort of deadline 
which guaranteed that nothing useful 
could be done. As a consequence the pub-
lications which resulted have no substan-
tial reference to the multi-faith situation 
which confronts us. They are content with 
2 or 3 platitudinous references to the fact 
that opportunity should be open to all ir-
respecti ve of such issues as religion. 
However, to have been faced with a 
25th hour request which it could not meet, 
is no reason for the AASR to decide that it 
will take its marbles and go home. It may 
well be a major area of social responsibil-
ity for the Association to set about build-
ing awareness in Australia and helping 
Australians to understand the situation 
which already exists and to deal construc-
tively with it. In another way then the 
AASR could be seen as less of an academic 
fox hole in which to take refuge from the 
real world. 
There is not a little experience to call 
upon out of our past as a people. We were 
beset with Protestant-Catholic fears and 
resentments for much of our history, but 
fortunately weathered these without too 
many physical casualties. The situation in 
this field is now vastly improved and mu-
tual respect is widespread, albeit not yet 
universal. It may be little more than wish-
ful thinking, but ins to be hoped that out 
of the experiences of common schooling 
and even of propinquity those of various 
faiths will learn to live together as have 
those of various denominations. This is 
said along with the recognition that some 
bring to Australia religious, political and 
national commitments which may daunt 
older Australians and even cause consid-
erable alarm - as did those related to un-
derstandable Irish resentments in days 
gone by. We have no need of attitudes and 
practices, which however relevant to other 
situations, will be disruptive of social 
harmony, and O'Farrell is right to alert us 
to this - although I find that his approach 
is less open than might be helpful to any-
thing but the 'prevailing and accepted 
traditional Australian religious 
orthodoxies' . 
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A sign of our maturity as a people, 
largely fashioned in our past by aspects of 
the Judaeo-Christian tradition, may well 
be an openness to learn, as part of the 
process of accommodation, to examine in-
herited viewpoints more rigorously than 
we have ever had to do before - our 
'Judaeo-Christian ghetto' days are gone. 
Clearly, widespread understanding will 
be at a high premium, and out of it a 
readiness to stand alongside those who 
grieve, for example, out of whatever reli-
gious and cultural background they come. 
Readiness to understand and to be flexible 
enough to accommodate as wide a range 
of customs and sensibilities as are 
amenable with the general well being of 
the whole community is a necessity -
rather than the arrogant demand that all 
conform with that with which most of us 
are comfortable. 
To conclude by returning to where we 
began, O'Farrell has joined others in iden-
tifying a significant area of growth in the 
sphere of religion in Australia. At first 
there is indeed something quite startling 
in the increase between 1967 & 1986 from 
0.3% to 12.8% of the population who de-
clare on census returns that they have 'No 
Religion'. The number of those who de-
cline to answer the question, as is their 
right, has remained at about 11 % over the 
same period. There are real problems 
about simply adding the figures from any 
one year together, as does O'Farrell, and 
in concluding from this that acknowl-
edged religious disbelief or indifference 
marks about 1 in 4 Australians. On the 
other hand such a ratio sells short the 
number of those whose overall stance to-
wards formal and institutional religious 
belief and practice is apathy and/or an-
tagonism. The fact that currently at least 
40% of marriages in Australia are per-
formed by civil celebrants is probably a 
much more accurate guide to the real 
situation. So I doubt that what is being re-
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vealed in census forms is anything but the 
tip of the iceberg. 
What we sample here is a situation 
which has been hidden from general view 
for probably as long as Europeans have 
lived in Australia. Of course, pockets of 
settlers here and there would have given 
the lie to such a claim. But the overall pic-
ture is of a people the majority of whom, 
while ready to admit to 'belief in a God' 
and to deny atheism, are loath to take this 
further into commitment to and support 
for those institutions which lay claim to 
'God-believers'. What has become clearer 
in the last few decades, in part because of 
changes in the census forms themselves, is 
closer to the actual situation. No longer do 
the same number of people feel social 
pressure to affirm beliefs or memberships 
which they do not in fact hold or exercise 
in any effective way. To amend O'Farrell's 
trenchant comment 
'dissent is not so much dissent within 
Christianity as dissent from Christianity'. 
The roots of such dissent, its 
manifestations, its growth, and its 
implications all demand study. Such a 
task certainly is within the charter of the 
AASR and it is surely time that it was ad-
dressed. Our thanks to Professor O'Farrell 
for his reminder and his insights. 
A Response to Patrick O'Farrell 
Norman Habel 
S.A. College of Advanced Education 
Patrick's play on Pyke's term 'dissent' is a 
happy one. Today 'dissent' from the 
mainstream by active devotees issbm~~ 
what rare. Religion is no longer part of the ' 
public ethos in politic~ oreduc~tion. ' 
"Religion is between ,me andine·God.'~To 
speak about God in relation to the econ- ' 
omy, government policy, the press orfo.;, ' 
turology is to speak out of tum. Even the' 
avowed Christian tends to keep Christ to 
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himself or herself. To dissent is to speak 
up about one's faith or Lord in public or 
the pub. The popular response will 
probably be 'pull your head in.' And the 
devotees of the many faiths, with but few 
exceptions, have been pulling in rather 
than dissenting! And I agree with Patrick 
that the atrophy of religious or spiritual 
values in Australian society deserves seri-
ous study. What has taken their place? 
As Patrick suggests, space and distance 
may have been a fortuitous circumstance 
which kept early groups from experienc-
ing some of the conflicts of other compact 
communities. Yet, I recall from my youth, 
Patrick, that we Lutherans and you 
Catholics were at loggerheads. The battle 
of the Reformation was still being fought 
in our pulpits. We would not pray with 
you; you worshipped 'another God.' 
Thankfully that has changed. But at what 
cost? Proximity is not the basis of the 
change. Something else has taken the fire 
out of the faith we once fought for with 
such fervour! Tolerance has become indif-
ference. What has caused this change in 
attitude? 
True, irreligion and the broad hedonis-
tic philosophy of life which marks the 
premature move of Australians into a 
post-industrial society are indeed chal-
lenges for the Christian Church. Religious 
bodies, which tend to be conservative, are 
in danger of being left in another world if 
the rate of social and economic changes 
predicted by futurologists such as Herman 
Kahn and Daniel Bell continues apace. 
Religious miracles can no longer match 
technological marvels; to denounce multi-
nationals as Mammon is likely to have lit-
tle effect. Whence religion in the interna-
tional economy? 
The need to explore the multi-religious 
in the context of thernulti-cultural is evi-
,dent. The question a(issue is the purpose 
of such a study. To understand the phe-
, nomenon? Indeed! To work toward a 
government policy'maintaining the rights' 
of religious groups to dissent from the ir-
religious public Weltanschauung of 
Australia? ,Perhap~! To give the total reli-
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gious community courage to assert itself 
collectively? Less likely. To create a lobby 
for producing effective responses or. 
initiatives of an academic, political or so-
cial nature? Worth considering! Given, as 
Patrick notes, the poor intellectual repute 
of religion in Australia, a conference of all 
religious groups to address the issues of 
their collective role in Australia would be 
a notable first. It is doubtful whether the 
AASR, with its academics interested in 
personal fields of research, would ever 
take up such a challenge. 
Patrick is justified in lamenting the 
withdrawal of any serious study of reli-
gion in the public educational systems. 
The vision of the mid-seventies, which 
brought many of us back to Australia, that 
religion was to be a required component 
of the school curriculum, faded quickly. 
The teachers were protective of their own 
fields, the churches were suspicious and 
the educational leaders succumbed to 
other more practical dreams. And I would 
agree, that the religion courses at the vari-
ous colleges and universities have rela-
tively little interaction with the religious 
bodies of Australia and even less impact 
on the wider affairs of Australian life and 
culture. But then, Religion Studies and 
Religious Education, as something other 
than a denominational exercise, are new 
phenomena in Australia. The question is 
whether, given this dissent from religion, 
the wider study of Religion has arrived 
too late to gain the intellectual 
respectability demanded to speak effec-
tively on public issues. 
Perhaps, as Patrick suggests, religion 
has been more quietly significant than we 
realise. "Quietly" is certainly the operative 
word today. And maybe religion is a 
sleeping giant, waiting for the barbs of 
anti-religion to wake her. Certainly we 
appreciate the barbs of Patrick himself 
reminding us that an Association obsessed 
with academic trivia will contribute little 
to the understanding and voice of religion 
as part of the cultural world of Australia. 
A major study of religion and society 
would be a worthy focus for the 
Association in the future. 
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I have appreciated the reflections of 
Patrick on the role of Religion in 
Australia's past and its malaise in the pre-
sent. I would like to have read more pro-
jections or agendas for the future ... as the 
title of the article suggests. But that is a 
minor cavil. More important is the future 
of 'dissent,' not as an apologia but as en-
gagement of religion with society. 
Is there an Australian religion? 
A reply to Prof. O'Farrell 
Klaus-Peter Koepping 
Baldwin Spencer Professor 
of Anthropology 
School of Asian Studies 
Melbourne University 
In his keynote address to the Australian 
Association for the Study of Religions in 
1986, Prof. O'Farrell discusses some very 
provocative ideas in the context of reli-
gious studies and religious life in 
Australia. Some of the main points he 
contends that scholars of religious affairs 
are neglecting, are 1) the rejection of reli-
gion by growing numbers, 2) the degener-
ation of the study of religion from per-
sonal commitment to scholarly distance, 3) 
the increase of non-Christian topics at re-
ligious conferences, 4) the excision of seri-
ous religious studies from the educational 
system, 5) the impotence of religion in af-
fairs of state and religion's poor intellec-
tual repute, and 6) the danger of ideolo-
gies being fused with certain religious be-
liefs or denominations which go against 
the traditional grain of Australian cultural 
orthodoxy. 
There are many more challenging and 
thought-provoking points emerging from 
the address, but these six points, which I 
think are clearly interrelated, should be 
debated in depth, not only because they 
are the raison d'etre of this society, but also 
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because they lie at the heart of the very 
question, "what is religion, how do we 
define it, in which way do we or should 
we approach it?" Before going into these 
six points, I would like however to ques-
tion the very title of the address itself, for 
it reveals a certain uneasiness and 
ambivalence. 
The title speaks of "Australian 
Religion": this seems to imply an unusual 
understanding of the manifestations of re-
ligion. Do we have or do we ever speak of 
German religion, Indian religion, Japanese 
religion, or French religion? In the case of 
Germany and France the answer is abso-
lutely clear: we do not use such designa-
tions. In the case of India and Japan, all 
the literature can do is to refer to 
"Japanese religions" or ''Indian religions", 
or to specify the particular creed or de-
nomination, such as Hinduism, Jainism, 
Buddhism, Shinto etc. in the same way as 
we speak of Protestantism, Orthodoxy and 
Catholicism in the Euro-American context. 
The notion of German or Australian reli-
gion implies that a national entity shares· a 
certain culture, identifiable pattern of lan-
guage and behaviour, beliefs and actions, 
and that it shares a I.Ireligion", indeed that 
this cultural sharing is a religion. 
The only way we can condone such a 
loose usage of 'religion' is in a very 
"secularized" and actually metaphorical 
way, when we are discussing the core of 
ultimate values shared by a group who 
identify as a group. Through this common 
culture and the shared values, members 
identify each other, demarcate themselves 
from outsiders and other groups, and le-
gitimate through a value-rational com-
mitment their social mores, their customs, 
their way of life, their very distinctiveness 
and identity. 
To call such a value-system a religion is 
rather misleading, as normally we reserve 
such a term for value-systems which find 
their ultimate legitimation in a non-hu-
man, super-human, supernatural, ideal 
world of forms, of divinity or in the laws 
. of the universe, in personal or impersonal 
forces which are assumed to govern natu-
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ral, including human, affairs, controlling 
life and death, birth and fate, forces which 
have once and for all laid down the laws 
governing social and natural life. These 
ordinances are re-enacted, re-created or 
commemorated in ritual and put to mem-
ory in sacred texts, epics and poetry. 
In other words, religion always refers 
to the sacred realm as opposed to the 
secular human and natural realms, though 
this dichotomy is not always easy to de-
lineate. Through ritual many acts and 
forms of utterances which are normally 
secular become sacred. The religious rules 
adhered to by a group are conceived by 
that group as divinely decreed in illo tem-
pore, or given as revelation through divine 
inspiration to humans until the existing 
present. 
There can thus be no such thing as an 
'Australian religion', not even in the be-
ginnings, not even in the beginnings of 
South Australia. It is certainly true that 
many shared the belief in the Paradise of 
Dissent, in the antipodean possibility of an 
Edenic new beginning, with the hope of 
the improvement and perfection of 
mankind at a pristine place. The 
Lutherans from Prussia who left because 
of state persecution shared this hope and 
millennial expectation with their benefac-
tor and economic supporter George Fife 
Angas: but the motives of a diversity of 
German ethnic sub-groups with distinct 
pietist or Lutheran beliefs and the almost 
Calvinist creed of Angas that money and 
influence are only worthwhile when used 
for the greater glory of God, did not of 
themselves create an Australian religion. 
Already in the first few decades of its 
existence as colonial outpost of the impe-
rial power of England, Australia was rid-
dled with interdenominational strife 
between Anglicans, Catholics and 
Protestant denominations. Even within 
such a community enterprise as that of the . 
German migration to South Australia no 
consensus of a religious kind existed, a 
situation which was neatly described in 
1938 by one of the historians of the South 
Australian German Church,Theodor 
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Hebart. Such schism was expectable, as 
the Germans who later formed the 
Lutheran Church of Australia were ho-
mogeneous neither in regard to religion, 
politics nor cultural background. As 
Hebart says, in the South Australia of the 
1840s, the bells pealed messages to their 
parishioners: 'We are the Church", say 
the Catholics; ''No, you are not", retorts 
the Church of England, and Hebart con-
tinues: "The Congregational bells an-
nounce merrily 'Independent'; the 
Methodists beg, 'Collection, please"'. 
Hebart in 1938 gives a beautiful exam-
ple of the apologetics of dissent when he 
insists that the Lutheran Church stood 
"firmly ... on the solid ground of the fun-
damentals, and therefore never ceased to 
proclaim Christ as the One who died for 
the salvation of sinners". And he contin-
ues: "This is all the more astonishing as 
the Lutheran Church was surrounded by 
Churches which to a marked degree gave 
way to modernism". Each could proclaim 
The Way and did so. 
O'Farrell sees that dissent leads to 
strife, and Australia was no exception: 
whoever believes in the perfectibility of 
man, and risks persecution for his brand 
of perfectness and his ways to gain such, 
is prone to be not only dogmatic, but 
righteous, belligerent and aggressively 
exclusive. To speak of anything like 
" Australian religion" is therefore a daring 
feat of muddled historical discontinuities. 
The only Australian religion existing in 
1800, thousands of years before, and still 
with us is the religious system of the 
Aborigines, if one can generalize the ritu-
als and beliefs of a diversity of groups un-
der one umbrella. The only other way to 
describe "Australian religion" would per-
haps be to declare that "everybody has the 
right to become a saint in his own fash-
ion", a view which the enlightened and 
sceptical atheist Frederik the Second of 
Prussia held, as long as all the saints were 
also good citizens of the nation-state. 
Is it possibly this·-hopeful idyll that 
Australians of all backgrounds originally 
held one faith which makes O'Farrell un-
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easy about the multitude of topics which 
at a religious conference are interpreted as 
dissent from Christianity? I would main-
tain that the very concept of a thoroughly 
Christian Australia is itself a wishful im-
age which people under threat from but-
side, such as during world-wars, might 
have believed as an ideological expedient 
but, other than in confrontation, or on 
Lambing Flats, it has never existed. To 
speak, as O'Farrell does, of dissent in re-
gard to other creeds and denominations of 
non-Christian derivation gives the 
impression that these religions only exist 
and can only be discussed in the light of 
such a confrontation. This is, if not impe-
rialist thinking, at least suffused with a 
strong dose of soteriology and messian-
ism, as if these others are only worthy of 
discussion because they are different from 
Christianity, as if they only exist in order to 
become a fencing ground for Christian 
thinking, a reminder to consider God or 
our own souls. But several of these 
systems of belief and ritual existed thou-
sands of years before Christianity, and it is 
only through the Christian emphasis on 
the One way of salvation that difficulties 
arise. Otherwise, one could dispassion-
ately discuss otherness in religious and in 
other contexts for that matter. 
This brings me to the second point of 
challenge: what about these anti-religious 
feelings, irreligiosity or rejection of reli-
gion, which O'Farrell assumes from the 
shrinkage in the denominational count 
and census-declarations? As he has him-
self rightly Seen, many other cults have 
grown over the last few decades in 
Australia, the evangelical and charismatic 
movement has increased in giant strides, 
and figures are still notoriously unreliable. 
Is it not perhaps a sign that people be-
gin to perceive denominational adherence 
as irrelevant, beyond their true wants and 
needs? Can it not rather be a dissatisfac-
tion with the message proclaimed in insti-
tutionalized churches? And is somebody 
who professes not to belong to any de-
nomination necessarily non-religious or 
anti-religious? To put the question more 
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specifically and at the same time more 
generally: is a Marxist-Leninist necessarily 
non-religious? What about the philoso-
phers of the Enlightenment? As Karl 
L6with has so long ago quite cogently 
pointed out, Marx may be seen as one of 
the most religious men of 19th century 
Europe, and the same is certainly true of 
pietist enlightenment thinkers like Herder, 
or even professed atheists like Voltaire. 
All of them believed in the improvability 
of mankind, in the admittedly rational or-
ganisation of human affairs, as did many 
Renaissance thinkers, as did Plato. 
Yet it is inconceivable that these sys-
tems of values could have been created 
without recourse to or the background of 
the Christian message. No Hegel could 
have thought out his dialectic without the 
messianic message of the saviour, without 
the idea of the teleological foundation of 
nature and history, and nor could the ad-
vocates of an ethics of natural law and 
natural justice. As Gluckman pointed out, 
even the Lozi kingdom of Central East 
Africa in its justice system had recourse to 
the ultimate legitimation of the law of na-
ture and to the ultimate definition of a 
human p~rson as one who had kinship-
laws, which implies an ultimate ground-
ing of the social order in original times. 
The sceptic, like the Mephistophelean 
devil in Goethe's Faust, might say: °1 hear 
the message, but I lack belief in it": this 
does not make the devil irreligious. To 
sum up this point: I am very sceptical 
about any claim to irreligiosi ty or anti-
religious feelings or the imputation of 
such to people. 
It is a completely different matter from 
the issue of religion/ irreligion, if denomi-
national and institutional religion wanes: 
that still does not say anything about the 
religiosity of people nor about the conduct 
of their life not being guided by ultimate 
principles; Certainly we will find the 
pragmatist, the opportunist and the 
power-hungry among us: each society has 
criminals too. I am not sure what ideal 
O'Farrell is hinting at: but my suspicion 
from- his text is that he yearns for the per-
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fect world in which religion (which he 
does not define) of one particular kind 
dominates all spheres of life. But those 
imagined theocratic times of ancient 
Mexico, of Mesopotamia and possibly in 
Aboriginal Australia are no more, for so-
cial differentiation brings about the seg-
mentation of concerns, of values, of goals 
and of the means to achieve diverse goals. 
Maybe people have matured in their 
belief as well as in their rational debunk-
ing of authoritarianism; and let us not for-
get that this individualistic streak is also 
one of the markers of the Australian his-
torical heritage, or at least a wishful and 
still powerful ideal image for many 
Australians. Trends which O'Farrell 
doubtless perceives as signs of decline 
may also be taken as signs of freeing our-
selves from the era of nonage to become 
more enlightened about our own selves. 
This does not necessarily have to lead into 
hedonism and the pursuit of material 
happiness or an aggressive free for all so-
ciety. The very pluralistic make-up of 
Australia has taught us much about get-
ting along without impinging on the 
others' cherished beliefs. We may enjoy 
ethnic festivals, wonder that parts of the 
Australian public have become more open 
and accommodating than the ethnocentric 
ocker of yore. Multi-religiosity is but one 
facet of this. 
There are other issues in this paper 
which worry me. I cannot see what rela-
tion the move from a philosophical to an 
emotional religion can have to the waning 
of the power of religious thought over the 
counsels of the nation, and secondly I 
cannot see at all why as O'Farrell put it, 
°the evangelical, individualist and 
charismatic swing", which may be an em-
pirical fact, should be looked at nega-
tively. Is this movement not one of 
personal commitment? And why should 
only philosophical religion be of interest? 
Does O'Farrell seriously think that the 
protagonists of diverse denominations in 
the 19th and early 20th century in 
Australia, when pushing the Irish or 
English bandwagQn, were intellectually 
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our betters? I think that on the contrary 
overall Australian scholarship in religion 
has considerably improved over those pi-
ous and interest-governed - one hesitates 
to use the term - theologians, cum 
preachers and powerbrokers of the past. It 
may certainly be true that a united 
denominational force may have had more 
clout in political affairs, because they 
played as interest-groups in political cir-
cles, were parties in their own right. The 
emergence of personal religion which does 
not follow the dictates of Papal or other 
authorities may indeed not have the 
power of block-votes: does that diminish 
it? 
The third issue is closely related to this 
conundrum: I cannot see why O'Farrell 
insists that, the removal of religion from 
the educational structures imposed, as he 
put it, "a gradual degradation on the 
intellectual level of that interest". In an-
other paragraph he deplores the fact that 
scholars, intellectuals par excellence I 
would have thought, approach religion 
from a dispassionate angle, not from one 
of commitment. Well, we cannot have it 
both ways here. The removal of religious 
debate from educational institutions does 
not necessarily need to lead to degrada-
tion. Religion as a personal concern 
(maybe with important social functions) 
about the ultimate meaning of life, of na-
ture and mankind, of the interrelations 
between people, and people and the envi-
ronment, will, if withheld from the intel-
lectual disciplines, flourish in personal 
belief, commitment to and attendance at 
places where religion is preached and 
practiced. People will still go to their con-
gregations, their priests and pastors, and 
will, if they are serious about it, try to lead 
a life according to precepts into which 
they are born or which they have joined. 
Intellectual debate and personal com-
mitment to faith have something in com-
m~n: they depend on each other, but are 
very different forms of discourse, as it is 
labeled nowadays. But I wQuld see com-
mitment and detachment in a different 
relationship than is implied by O'Farrell. 
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If we want informed intellectual debate, as 
we had for over 2000 years, on exegesis 
and meaning, on salvation and afterlife, 
on the right way to live, on tolerance and 
commitment and their intellectually insol-
uble contradictions which each and all of 
us have to solve in our own way in liv~ng 
and co-existing with other human beings, 
then we do not have to be committed to 
what we discuss. We may be committed to 
some form of religious belief, but we 
could discuss other forms of belief without 
always having recourse to our own belief 
- though we might actually understand 
the other better by recourse to our own 
commitment, indeed we might wakeup to 
what our own commitment really is when 
encountering the other. The theologian is 
not necessarily a better theologian because 
he is committed to a particular brand of 
belief: it may take the committed believer, 
especially one with wobbly foundations, 
more effort actually to discuss religion on 
an intellectually satisfying basis, without 
recourse to the scriptural texts of his par-
ticular belief system, because he has to 
gain perspective, to examine his own un-
questioned, taken-for-granted system of 
assumptions, prejudices and principles. 
This confrontation is indeed easier when 
stirred through the encounter with 
Outside, with Otherness. 
Simmel's image of the stranger is still 
one of the most potent when extended to 
this dilemma: strangeness and nearness, 
distance and passion, commitment and 
detachment are inextricably intertwined, 
dialectically indivisible, if our aim is un.;. 
derstanding and empathy with and for the 
other, as well as of and for ourselves. 
Without self-love we will not be able to 
extend love to others, and without experi-
ence of love from outside (from other 
people or from the totally other source of 
divinity) we will never be able to love 
ourselves. And without love for the sub-
ject matter, not necessarily belief in it, 
commitment to canons of rationality, de-
bate and intellectual honesty, we will not 
know what it means to believe, to suspenc 
judgement: Kant knew this very well. 
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I do not at all understand why it would 
matter that courses on the Reformation are 
not always 'religious'. Indeed, I do not 
know what 'religious' is supposed to 
mean in this context. For me, it would be 
as valid and as religious to speak in such 
context of the social conditions and cul-
tural parameters which brought the re-
formation movement about, or in which it 
was intellectually embedded, as to read 
the Encomium Morise of Erasmus as an in-
road toward an understanding of desper-
ate believers, religious men and women 
who did not like what they saw happen-
ing. Should we not mention the atrocities 
committed by the early Church in Asia 
Minor against non-believers or other 
creeds and contrast them with the high 
point of tolerance of Arab courts at which 
Jewish theologians and philosophers 
could breathe, while the very same Jews 
were put in body and book to the autodafe 
as soon as the Holy Mother Church re-
conquered the areas? What about the Bull 
of Tordesillas concerning the sub-human 
nature of Non-Christians of the Americas? 
I am sure O'Farrell does not intend this, 
but it can be a logical extension of this 
plea. 
Commitment might take many differ-
ent forms. I do not know what a reli-
giously committed person should teach, 
but I do say that any atrocity of mankind 
against its own should be pointed out as 
inhuman, by whomever it was committed. 
It is the very sign of commitment to the 
ultimate value of human life, for instance, 
to be able to distance ourselves from our 
own cherished beliefs in our own heritage, 
history and culture to the extent that we 
are able to point to the inhumanities 
committed by dogmatists of our own ilk. 
But then for this stance I do not have to be 
a believer in religious truth; I can be a ra-
tionalist who agrees with Voltaire or 
Herder or Bentham or others of our 
Enlightenment past, a past which is still, at 
least for scholars if not for statesmen, a 
cornerstone of our social order. Yet again, 
it is obvious that the deification of Reason 
has led mankind to as many atrocities as 
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has the worship of institutional religious 
power or of dogmas of faith. We may have 
to remain inconsistent to a certain extent: 
yet the mark of scholarship is the com-
mitment to the truth, and that commit-
ment should be more than an intellectual 
play with logical niceties or oratorical 
skills. More than formal, scholarship 
should be emotional. The scholar's com-
mitment is one to the emancipatory power 
of dialogue with other people, whether he 
is a religious believer or not. Knowledge 
and faith need not be united: they operate 
in very different frames of discourse, one 
in the realm of ultimate Truth, the other in 
the realm of the rational and emotive 
sphere of ~umanity. The danger for the 
intellectual debate arises when the com-
mitment to the search for knowledge as a 
means toward emancipation from 
bondage, nonage and authoritarian sub-
mission is replaced by mental fireworks of 
the circus-show, when ecstatic delivery 
pandering for audience applause (with the 
obligatory "in-jokes") becomes the means 
for self-gratification. 
Yet commitment to belief does not pre-
clude intellectual doubt: the theologian 
Bultman makes this clear. We may be 
aware from our experience of social life 
that it is impossible to have both equality 
and freedom, yet we are still able to hope 
for the ideal. We may intellectually believe 
it impossible to have social life without 
hierarchy and order, but we may still be-
lieve in the ideal of non-hierarchical social 
relations. As Kolakowski once said, we 
may think it right to hold up the laws of 
the state, but if we see a neighbour enjoy-
ing a forbidden food, we may cherish the 
value of the neighbour's friendship higher 
than the value of upholding the laws of 
the state. We are all rather inconsistent, 
and thus very human, in having our per-
sonal value-hierarchies. Yet living in a 
pluralist society, it is difficult to irrlagine a 
state authority subscribing to any specific 
value-hierarchy; as religions and denomi-
nations themselves squabble about rights 
and wrongs, we cannot fault the state for 
not subscribing to "religjous values". 
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The intellectual's prerogative and brief 
is to be critical, to have distance, to be a 
disinterested observer. Otherwise no the-
ologian could in good faith turn the 
phrases of the prophets over and over in 
order to for instance discover similarities 
of textual form, of fore-runners, of 
similarities to, let us say, other prophetic 
writings in the Near East in the times of 
the Old Testament. This does not mean 
that belief has to degenerate. It may flour-
ish and find expression in communal 
worship and sacrificial participation, 
whether people participate because they 
cherish human contact or the reaffirma-
tion of their social nature, or whether they 
do it because they cherish the holy sacra-
ments as re-union with the divine. 
Let me close by noting that O'Farrell 
has put his finger on a timely concern. 
Scholarly discussions of religious matters 
have in general not progressed very far, 
for we still live off the conceptual capital 
of our masters, Weber, Durkheim, 
Troeltsch, Bultman or the Church Fathers, 
yet, measured against their achievements, 
the plethora of papers at some conferences 
can seem trivial, repetitive and in the 
worst case irrelevant, ignorant, or both. 
But this is not a particularly Australian 
problem or one of Religious Studies alone. 
With the explosion of teaching positions, 
the increasing number of people achieving 
higher educational degrees, the quality of 
a time when only one in ten thousand 
would have becomeoa reasonable scholar 
cannot be expected to be retained. Not ev-
ery parish-priest can be a great preacher 
and thinker like Thomas Aquinas or 
Luther; not every believer can be as com-
mitted as a martyr, and not every religious 
experience can match Theresa of Avila, 
Juan de la Cruz or Hildegard of Bingen. 
All these points should be widely dis-
cussed,certainly at conferences of 
Religious Studies. This reply to some of 
~O'Farrell' s points is not intended as insult 
ad personam, but should be seen as genuine 
concern for a debate, a passionate one, I 
would hope, but also a disinterested one. 
It is not so much the questions which 
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O'Farrell raises and short-comings he im-
plies which aroused my interest. What I 
miss in his remarks are any unqualified 
statements as to his own preferences, be-
liefs, definitions and solutions. His ad-
dress left me hanging in the air looking for 
one definite honest statement of "what I 
think should be done". 
It is not enough to toss out such state-
ments as (on multi-religiosity of confer-
ence topics): "And a good thing too, I hear 
you say. Why is it a good thing? A good 
thing or otherwise, what are the implica-
tions and consequences for this culture in 
this place and time?" No direct answer is 
given by O'Farrell. Is it a good thing to 
talk about Shinto and Buddhism on a par 
with Christianity? I gather, he means to 
say, "no, I wish it were not, even though I 
must/ should say it is". He later declares 
that he wishes Australia to remain a plural 
society. How can we truly exercise plural-
ism, if we do not put Buddhism on par 
with Christianity? 
Response to Patrick O'Farrell 
John 0' Arcy May 
Irish School of Ecumenics 
.Oublin 
Patrick O'Farrell's 1986 keynote address 
was both timely and useful, though his 
strictures on the AASR are not entirely 
justified. To have provided the forum for 
significant discussion and publishing in 
areas such as the place of the land and of 
women in Australian Aboriginal religion 
or the role of Asian religions in the cuJ-
tures of some of our most important 
neighbours is no mean achievement. But 
this type of praise begs one of Professor 
O'Farrell's main questions: "~Vhy is it a 
good thing" to treat Christianity "on a 
par" with other world faiths, and why is 
"dissent from Christianity" apparently a 
matter of indifference to students of 
'religion in general' or 'any religion except 
Christianity'? More reflection is obviously 
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in order, and I am grateful to have been 
asked to help the process along. 
My ability to comment on the study of 
religion in Australia, however, is severely 
limited by my 20 years of exile. But per-
haps if readers whistle the recent hit tune 
From a distance ... under their breath as 
they proceed, the following remarks may 
be seen in their proper perspective. 
Indeed, it is largely due to the publications 
and conferences of the AASR that I have 
been able to keep in touch at all with the 
development of religion and the study of 
religion in Australia. After a trip home in 
1977, during which I discovered the AASR 
shortly after its foundation and visited 
some of the departments of religious 
studies already existing in a number of 
capital cities, I was so enthusiastic that I 
published an article on it in a German pe-
riodical after my return. It was entitled 
Der Lotos in der Wilste ("The Lotus" - the 
study of religious traditions whose unfa-
miliarity makes them appear exotic - "in 
the Desert" - of Australian social and in-
tellectual secularism). Re-reading this in 
the light of Professor O'Farrell's address 
.and subsequent experience of AASR, I 
find some of the issues I touched on even 
more relevant now than they were then. 
One point I raised, however, has by 
now become such a cliche that one hesi-
ta tes to repeat it: I saw Australia in the 
throes of a search for identity and the bur-
geoning study of religion in tha t context. 
In this bicentenary year the Australian 
identity crisis seems further along the road 
to resolution than it was in 1977, at least if 
the glowing documentaries cluttering the 
screens of British and Irish television, the 
omnipresence of Clive james's bland wit-
ticisms and the triumph of Dame Edna 
Everage are any indication of confident 
self-projection. A growing interest in local 
- and colonial- history was one expres-
sion of this need to define an Australian 
identity; the other was an increasing 
awareness of our incongruity in the Pacific 
context into which that history had uncer-
emoniously dumped us. Since then I have 
come to see the Pacific as the new 
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Mediterranean: not a barrier but a bond-
ing agent, a watery membrane through 
which an entirely unprecedented osmosis 
ofcultq.res is taking place. Australia is part 
of that; being part of that is perhaps the 
most exciting thing about contemporary 
Australia; and, as Professor O'Farrell 
rightly brings to the attention of us stu-
dents of religion, "this fact of life" makes 
inescapable demands on the universities 
and the intellectual community - not 
least the Christian churches. 
It is at this point that i feel able to bring 
my highly diverse experiences at an ecu-
menical institute in a German university 
and at the Melanesian Institute in Papua 
New Guin,ea to bear on the study of reli-
gion in Australia and thus to come to 
grips with some of the issues pinpointed 
by Professor O'Farrell. The Federal 
Republic of Germany has been reluctant to 
acknowledge that it has become a country 
with significant and steadily growing im-
migration, particularly for Muslim Turks 
(one and a half million, 57% of whom are 
there to stay) and Yugoslavs (half a mil-
lion, 78%; Dieter Oberndorfer in the 
Rheinischer Merkur, 29.1.1988). In the sev-
enties there was much talk about the so-
cial responsibility of the universities, but 
whereas the theology faculties were 
among the most activist in taking up this 
challenge and the most sophisticated in 
their intellectual response to it, other 
traditional disciplines such as history and 
Religionswissenschaft were among the 
slowest to evolve new methodologies in 
both teaching and research. In Australia, 
where the recently expanded colleges of 
divinity affiliated to universities are only 
remotely comparable to the theology fac-
ulties traditional in most European uni-
versities, most of the burden of mounting 
the response to a multi-religious society 
falls on the departments and programmes 
of Religious Studies which cooperate in 
AASR. This comparison helps us to iden-
tify the deficiency pointed out by 
Professor O'Farrell: the academic study of 
religion and religions, even when the re-
sources of philosophy and the social 
-
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sciences are brought to bear on it, does not 
of itself result in adequate analysis of the 
ways in which ~insiders' and ~outsiders' 
with respect to the various religious com-
munities involved perceive and influence 
one another's values and beliefs, as N. 
Ross Reat has illustrated in a well known 
article (JAAR 51 (1983) 459-476). 
In Papua New Guinea, with AASR 
member Garry Trompf as comrade-in-
arms, I become involved in attempts to re-
establish religious studies in the history 
department of the University of Papua 
New Guinea. It is not without relevance 
for our topic that I found myself doing 
this on behalf of the Melanesian Council of 
Churches and the Melanesian Association 
of Theological Schools. Admittedly, I had 
my work cut out explaining to some peo-
ple in the churches that what was envis-
aged was not simply Christian doctrine 
but the study of Melanesian and other 
Pacific religious traditions and preparing 
the ground for the eventual inclusion of 
Islam and Asian and African religion. But 
the major obstacle was the ingrained hos-
tility of some Australians in the university 
to any study of any religion under univer-
sityauspices. This attitude seemed to me 
not only singularly inappropriate in a new 
nation confronted by the ethical dilemmas 
inherent in independence and develop-
ment and deeply involved in the interac-
tion of Christian with indigenous religious 
traditions, but quite simply anachronistic. 
No one seriously engaged in business or . 
politics, development or even tourism in 
today's global environment can afford to 
be without an adequate understanding of 
. the religious traditions touched by his or 
her enterprise. To profess enlightened in-
terest in multi-culturalism to the exclusion 
of multi-religiousness, as Professor 
O'Farrell rightly points out, is myopic in 
the extreme. 
. But what of those who are committed 
to the study of religion yet have com-
plexes about their Christianity? The com-
plicity of Christian missionary zeal in 
colonialism and what Professor O'Farrell 
justly calls "a profound movement away 
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from philosophic religion to emotional re-
ligion" are not in themselves reasons for 
elevating value-neutrality and the scien-
tific objectivity of "remote clinicians" to 
the status of an ideology whilst disl1'\issing 
the extraordinarily fruitful problematic 
introduced into the study of religion by 
Christian theology under the guise of es-
chewing "judgements ... on the truth value 
of any religion, tribal or universal" (from 
the religious studies programme of an 
Australian CAE). Every religious tradition 
has its equivalent of what Christians call 
theology, a hermeneutic immanent in its 
ways of formulating, adapting and pass-
ing on its beliefs and crucially concerned 
with questions of ultimate meaning and 
truth. I fail to see how any of them can be 
adequately studied outside the framework 
of a comparative hermeneutics. The rise of 
fundamentalism, in particular, whether in 
Christian, Muslim or other contexts, turns 
on just such questions of the self-interpre-
tation of traditions, and far from dampen-
ing interest in the study of religion it pre-
sents a peculiarly fascinating intellectual 
challenge which is only reluctantly being 
taken up. The immense resources at the 
disposal of Christian theology are still 
concentrated in the West, thus seriously 
distorting attempts at 'dialogue', but its 
centre of gravity is steadily shifting to 
Latin America, Asia and Africa, and the 
resulting effort to reformulate faith 
constitutes one of the most formidable in-
tellectual enterprises of our time. Why 
should the lessons being learned here be 
withheld from those engaged in the study 
of modern Buddhism or Islam under the 
pretext of ~objectivity' and ~neutrality'? 
Professor O'Farrell does not actually ac-
cuse the AASR of aiding and abetting such 
obscurantism, and neither do I, but it can 
be sensed lurking in the background. 
The upshot of all this would seem to be 
that there should be a discipline which 
transcends the-entirely artificial divide be-
tween ~theology' (and its equivalents) and 
'religious studies' (as a squeaky clean, 
bona fide enlightened pursuit). Secure pos-
session of such a discipline would obviate 
18 
most of Professor O'Farrell's criticism of 
the way in which religion is being studied 
in Australia at present. It would operate in 
the area scientists call 'basic research' (and 
Germans Grundlagenforschung). It would 
have to maintain a high level of abstrac-
tion while meeting Professor O'Farrell's 
demands for intelligibility and 'relevance'. 
For my own idiosyncratic reasons I have 
begun calling this as yet inchoate disci-
pline 'ecumenics', and now that I have be-
come established at the Irish School of the 
same in Dublin I find myself straddling 
daily the diminishing gap between intra-
christian dialogue, inter-religious dialogue 
and social ethics whilst negotiating with a 
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British university to assist in integrating 
peace and conflict studies into this already 
demanding programme. If this is possible 
in the constricting religio-political atmo-
sphere of Ireland, what should be possible 
in Australia's multi-religious society and 
Pacific context? 
The pioneers of both dissent from reli-
gion and religion as dissent were not 
Nietzsche, Marx and Freud but Gautama, 
Jesus and Muhammad. In our study of re-
ligious tradi tions let us not become entan-
gled all over again in elitism and sectari-
anism; let us aspire to their level of both 
criticism and vision. 
THE AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATION 
FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGIONS 
13th ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
The Women's College, University of Queensland 
1 - 4 September 1988 
Papers are invited for the following sections: 
Anthropology/Sociology of Religion 
Philosophy and Methodology of Religion 
Psychology of Religion 
Feminist Perspectives on Religion 
Religion and the Arts 
Primal Religions 
Judaism ~and Christianity 
Islam 
Hinduism and Buddhism 
East Asian Religions 
Registration Fee: $40; $15 for students. 
Accommodation available at The Women's College at $36 per day. 
For information contact Dr. Edgar Conrad or Dr. Rod Bucknell 
Dept. of Studies in Religion, University of Queensland, St. Lucia, Q 4067. 
Phone (07) 3772154 
